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1 Introduction 
 
Classical cryptography uses either public-private key pair or single secret shared key for 
encryption and decryption of a message. In a communication between two nodes, there is always 
a chance of MIM attack [1]. In the new encryption scheme for multi located parties by Kak [2], it 
is impossible for a localized eavesdropper to get control of the entire conversation since the 
points of entry and exit of data can be far apart physically. This note describes a modification to 
Kak’s three stage protocol for multi-located parties, which provides greater security. 
 
Basically, in distributed cryptography, the objective is to share the secret among several parties, 
similar to a case in a bank where k out of n officers use keys simultaneously to open a vault 
[3],[4]. Here each party is supposed to have computers at different locations and communication 
among them is secure. In the simplest case, we consider each party to have one main location 
and a subsidiary location that we call its agent.  The links between agents of different parties are 
not secure. 
 
In standard cryptography we use single transformations on data whereas in multi located parties 
we use transformations in sequence by several parties that guarantees the authentication. 
Furthermore, encrypted data can be divided into several modules or portions and sent over 
different channels. Multiple paths between sender and receiver make it easier to implement joint 
encryption and error correction coding, which cannot be achieved in such simplicity in 
traditional cryptography [5],[6],[7],[8]. 
 
In the case of multi located parties, the task of the eavesdropper is complicated by the fact that 
there exist multiple paths for the sender to send the information to the receiver. This makes it 
possible to develop rich protocols to guarantee security that take advantage of the multiple paths 
between sender and receiver. This will be done using the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key 
protocol for classical authentication [9]. There exists some overlap between these ideas and that 
of secret hardware, public key cryptography [10]. 
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In this paper, we first discuss different kinds of grammars to convert a given message into 
production sequence numbers and how these grammars can be applied to linguistic 
transformations. After that we will discuss systems based on multi-located parties and Kak’s 
three stage protocol for multi-located parties. The last section of the paper describes a new 
modified protocol implementing authentication and linguistic transformations for multi-located 
parties. 
 
2 Background 
 
We begin with a discussion of how the message is converted into a string of symbols using the 
production rules of an appropriate grammar G, which is a quadruple (V, T, P, S) defined as 
follows: 
 
V- Finite set of Non-Terminals or variables 
T-Finite set of Terminals 
P-Finite set of productions or rules defining a grammar 
S-Distinguished non-terminal called as start symbol 
 
Example of simple grammar: 
G= ({A, B, S}, {0, 1}, {S→AB, A→0B, B→10A, A→}, {S}) 
 
Grammars may be divided into four classes by gradually increasing restrictions on the form of 
productions in the Chomsky hierarchy. 
 
In this paper we use linguistic transformations based on context free grammars. The objective of 
splitting and sharing secret information is to generate the data in secret that can be shared by 
multiple authorized parties [11]. The general methodology using grammars for secret sharing 
among multiple parties consists of several steps such as 
 
1. Select a classical scheme for secret sharing 
2. Convert source data in the form of bit sequences 
3. Define grammar for generating secret for input message 
4. Using syntax analyzer to parse the bit sequence 
5. Generate sequence of grammatical rules 
6. Split the secret with selected threshold scheme 
7. Distribute the secret among multiple parties of the protocol 
 
Sender A wants to transmit a message to B. Sender A converts message into binary bits and 
selects an appropriate grammar to convert bits into production sequence number and B, who 
already know the grammar, can obtain the secret after receiving the production sequence 
number. 
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3 System Based on Multi-located Parties 
 
The system consists of sender A and receiver B who are globally distributed. Sender A has agent 
near B’s location and receiver B has agent near A’s location. Figure 1 shows secure 
communication for multi-located parties. 
 
 
                   Va  
M (1)           Va[M] Vb 
 
 
               (2) 
     Vb Va [M] 
 
 
 Va-1                                                
              Va-1 Vb Va  [M] 
(3) 
 
Fig-1: Three stage protocol  
 
 
 
Observations: 
A A’s agent B B’s agent 
 
A (Va) 
 
 
A’s agent (Va-1) 
 
 
B (Vb-1) 
 
 
B’s agent (Vb) 
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Protocol: 
1) A? B’s agent : VA[M] 
 
2) B’s agent ? A’s agent : VBVA[M] 
 
3) A’s agent ? B : VA-1VBVA[M] 
 
4) B finally performs transformation such that VAVB=VBVA 
In the above case, both nodes A and B do not trust each other so they use secret transformations 
Va  and Vb for authenticating transmissions between nodes  in such a way that VaVb=VbVa. In this 
protocol, A performs transformation on message M and sends it to B’s agent; B’s agent also 
perform transformation on received message and send it to A’s agent. A’s agent will perform 
inverse transformation on received message and transfer it to B. finally B applies Vb on received 
message to get the original message. In this way data is transformed securely avoiding main in 
the middle attack. 
 
3.1 Three stage protocol for multi-located parties 
 
We now outline a modification to the above scheme where the information available to the 
parties and their agents is not identical.  
 
                            Va Vb 
M (1) Va[M] 
 
 
 VbVa[M] 
                                                               (2) 
  
      Va-1 
  (3) Va-1Vb Va[M] 
 M 
           Figure 2: Three stage protocol for multi-located parties 
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This case can be viewed as, nodes A and B are distributed and it uses multiple agents for 
communication between A and B. The double arrow mark in the Figure 2 represents secure 
communication channel. 
 
Observations: 
A 
 
A’s agent B B’s agent 
 
A (Va, Va-1) 
 
 
A’s agent (Va-1) 
 
 
B (Vb, Vb-1) 
 
 
B’s agent (Vb) 
 
 
 
 
4 A new modified three stage protocol for multi-located parties 
 
This section discusses the proposal of new modified three stage protocol implementing 
authentication based on Needham-Schroeder protocol and linguistic transformation using 
grammars for multi-located parties. 
 
Description of protocol 
1.  
Node A ? BB: VAB 
 
     Node A?AA: VAA 
 
     Node A ? KDC: E (KA, [IDA, IDB, Na]) 
 
2.  
BB ? KDC: E (KB, [IDB, Nb, Tb,VAB]) 
 
3.  
KDC ? AA: E (KA, [IDB, Na, Tb, Ks])|| E (KB, [IDA, Ks, VAB]) 
 
4.  
AA ? Node B: E (KB,[IDA, Ks, VAB])||E (Ks, [Nb, VAA]) 
 
5.  
Node B: (VAAVAB, G) ? Input message 
 
Figure 3 depicts the following steps for multi-located parties: 
1)  
Node A perform transformations using grammar and divide it into two parts VAA, 
VAB  and send VAA to AA and other to BB and encrypted information of ID’s of 
6 
 
nodes A & B with a nonce Na to KDC  using shared key KA between node A and 
KDC. 
2)  
BB sends encrypted form of information containing his ID, nonce Nb and time 
stamp Tb along with VAB  to KDC using shared key KB between BB and KDC. 
 
 
Figure 3: Protocol implementing authentication and linguistic transformations for 
multi-located parties 
 
 
3)  
KDC assigns a session key and send information to AA containing  identity of B, 
nonce Na, time stamp Tb and session key Ks which is encrypted using A’s key KA  
and information containing identity of A,  a session key and VAB which is encrypted 
using B’s key KB . 
 
4)  
AA receives his nonce Na back and A is assured of timeliness by the session key and 
ensured that it’s not a replay. AA send information containing ID of A, session key 
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Ks and VAB which is encrypted using B’s key KB and encrypted form of nonce Nb 
and VAA using session key Ks. 
 
5)  
Finally, B receives two parts VAA and VAB and combines both. B use VAAVBB and 
grammar to reveal the secret. 
Observations: 
A AA B BB 
 
A (VA[M], KA, grammar, bit 
sequence number) 
 
 
AA (KA) 
 
 
B (KB, grammar, bit sequence number) 
 
 
BB (KB)  
 
 
Sender A performs linguistic transformations using grammars to convert a message into 
production sequence numbers. Destination B uses production sequence numbers and grammar to 
reveal the secret. 
 
Example: Linguistic transformations using grammars on input message 
 
Input Message: “hello” 
↓ 
Converting message into bits using 7 bit sequence:1000011101001100110111111011 
↓ 
Sender A- select bit sequence(e.g. 3 bit sequence): 1000011101001100110111111011 
↓ 
Sender A-select any type of grammar(e.g. context free grammar using 3 bit sequence) 
G=({S,A},{0,1},P, {S}) 
Where P is defined as follows 
1 S→BB 
2 B→AB 
3 B→€ 
4 A→000 
5 A→001 
6 A→010 
7 A→011 
8 A→100 
9 A→101 
10 A→110 
11 A→111 
↓ 
Use grammar to convert bits into production sequence number:1282521028272112=VA[M] 
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In Figure 4, sender A performs linguistic transformations on input message to produce VA [M]. 
Sender A will break transformed message into two parts VAA, VAB and transmit it to two agents 
AA and BB. BB encrypts message VAB  and send it to AA, who in turn send both VAA, VAB  to 
destination B. 
 
             VA[M]=VAAVAB 
 
          VAA VAB 
 
                                   E Kb(VAB) 
 
       VAA E (VAB) 
                                                            VAAVAB 
 
Figure 4. Protocol for linguistic transformations and secret sharing for multi-located 
parties 
5 Analysis of proposed protocol 
For two parties, A and B, that are globally distributed and want to exchange information among 
them, there are two other parties namely AA for A’s agent and BB for B’s agent, who participate 
to securely communicate information from source to destination. As discussed in the previous 
section, presence of KDC allows all the parties to authenticate and validate themselves before 
transmission. Since sender A performs transformations on input message using grammars, we 
will get a message that represents production sequence numbers. The most important part of the 
proposed protocol is that A breaks the transformed message into two parts and transmits these 
two parts to AA and BB.  
Since AA or BB know neither the grammar nor complete transformed message, they cannot 
construct the original message and also it is difficult for intruders to obtain the secret since 
transformed message is divided into parts and transmitted separately, avoiding MIM attack.  
Finally, rather than basing security on direct communication between two parties, the proposed 
protocol uses the concept of multiple parties between source and destination making it possible 
AA 
B 
BB
A 
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to obtain higher level of security. When two parties are globally distributed, this protocol can be 
implemented in a simple and secure manner. 
6 Weaknesses in the proposed protocol 
 
The proposed protocol may suffer from denial of service attack [12]. Since it is a distributed 
network and requires multiple agents to transmit information from source to destination, the 
attacker may overload the traffic to particular agent or multiple agents in a network so that 
network becomes slow and some agents are temporarily unavailable.  
 
Although the attacker may not get valuable or secret information from the network, he can slow 
down or stop the communication between multiple agents resulting in failure of transmitting the 
information completely or in time. 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
This paper presents a new modified protocol for multi-located parties. It implements both 
authentication and linguistic transformations in a multi-located environment. It solves the 
problem of MIM attack and replay attack for multi-located parties. The protocol may be 
strengthened by including the idea of puzzles [13] and that of recursive hidden secrets [14],[15]. 
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